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Abstract
We consider the problem of purchasing data for machine learning or statistical
estimation. The data analyst has a fixed budget to purchase datasets from multi-
ple data providers. She does not have any test data that can be used to evaluate
the collected data and can assign payments to data providers solely based on the
collected datasets. We consider the problem in the standard Bayesian paradigm
and in two settings: (1) data are only collected once; (2) data are collected repeat-
edly and each day’s data are drawn independently from the same distribution. For
both settings, our mechanisms guarantee that truthfully reporting one’s dataset is
always an equilibrium, by adopting techniques from peer prediction: pay each
provider the mutual information between his reported data and other providers’
reported data. Depending on the data distribution, the mechanisms can also dis-
courage misreports that would lead to inaccurate predictions. Our mechanisms
also guarantee individual rationality and budget feasibility for certain underlying
distributions in the first setting and for all distributions in the second setting.
1 Introduction
Data has been the fuel of the success of machine learning and data science, which is becoming a
major driving force for technological and economic growth. An important question is how to acquire
high-quality data to enable learning and analysis when data are private possessions of data providers.
Naively, we could issue a constant payment to data providers in exchange for their data. But data
providers can report more or less data than they actually have or even misreport values of their
data without affecting their received payments. Alternatively, if we have a test dataset, we could
reward data providers according to how well the model trained on their reported data performs on
the test data. However, if the test dataset is biased, this could potentially incentivize data providers
to bias their reported data toward the test set, which will limit the value of the acquired data for other
learning or analysis tasks. Moreover, a test dataset may not even be available in many settings.
In this work, we explore the design of reward mechanisms for acquiring high-quality data from
multiple data providers when a data buyer doesn’t have access to a test dataset. The ultimate goal
is that, with the designed mechanisms, strategic data providers will find that truthfully reporting
their possessed dataset is their best action and manipulation will lead to lower expected rewards. To
make the mechanisms practical, we also require our mechanisms to always have non-negative and
bounded payments so that data providers will find it beneficial to participate in (a.k.a. individual
rationality) and the data buyer can afford the payments.
In a Bayesian paradigm where data are generated independently conditioned on some unknown pa-
rameters, we design mechanisms for two settings: (1) data are acquired only once, and (2) data are
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acquired repeatedly and each day’s data are independent from the previous days’ data. For both set-
tings, our mechanisms guarantee that truthfully reporting the datasets is always an equilibrium. For
somemodels of data distributions, data providers in our mechanisms receive strictly lower rewards in
expectation if their reported dataset leads to an inaccurate prediction of the underlying parameters.1
While this doesn’t strictly discourage manipulations of datasets that do not change the prediction of
the parameters, it is a significant step toward achieving strict incentives for truthful reporting one’s
datasets, an ideal goal, especially because finding a manipulation without affecting the prediction
of the parameters can be difficult. Our mechanisms guarantee IR and budget feasibility for certain
underlying distributions in the first setting and for any underlying distributions in the second setting.
Our mechanisms are built upon recent developments [15, 14] in the peer prediction literature. The
insight is that if we reward a data provider the mutual information [15] between his data and other
providers’ data, then by the data processing inequality, if other providers report their data truthfully,
this data provider will only decrease the mutual information, hence his reward, by manipulating his
dataset. We extend the peer prediction idea developed by [15] to the data acquisition setting, and to
further guarantee IR and budget feasibility.
2 Related Work
The problem of purchasing data from people has been investigated with different focuses, e.g. pri-
vacy concerns [12, 9, 11, 21, 7, 26], effort and cost of data providers[23, 4, 1, 5, ?, 6], reward
allocation [10, 2]. Our work is the first to consider rewarding data without (good) test data that can
be used to evaluate the quality of reported data. Similar to our setting, [10, 2] consider paying to
multiple data providers in a machine learning task. They use a test set to assess the contribution of
subsets of data and then propose a fair measurement of the value of each data point in the dataset,
which is based on the Shapley value in game theory. Both of the works do not formally consider the
incentive compatibility of payment allocation. [26] proposes a market framework that purchases hy-
potheses for a machine learning problem when the data is distributed among multiple agents. Again
they assume that the market has access to some true samples and the participants are paid with their
incremental contributions evaluated by these true samples.
The main techniques of this work come from the literature of peer prediction [17, 22, 8, 24, 15,
14, 16, 13]. Peer prediction is the problem of information elicitation without verification. The
participants receive correlated signals of an unknown ground truth and the goal is to elicit the true
signals from the participants. In our problem, the dataset can be viewed as a signal of the ground
truth. What makes our problem more challenging than the standard peer prediction problem is that
(1) the signal space is much larger and (2) the correlation between signals is more complicated.
Standard peer prediction mechanisms either require the full knowledge of the underlying signal
distribution, or make assumptions on the signal distribution that are not applicable to our problem.
[14] applies the peer prediction method to the co-training problem, in which two participants are
asked to submit forecasts of latent labels in a machine learning problem. Our work is built upon the
main insights of [14]. We discuss the differences between our model and theirs in the model section,
and show how their techniques are applied in the result sections.
Our work is also related to Multi-view Learning (see [27] for a survey). But our work focuses on
the data acquisition, but not the machine learning methods used on the (multi-view) data.
3 Model
A data analyst wants to gather data for some future statistical estimation or machine learning tasks.
There are n data providers. The i-th data providers holds a dataset Di consisting of Ni data points
d
(1)
i , . . . , d
(Ni)
i with supportDi. The data generation follows a standard Bayesian process. For each
data set Di, data points d
(j)
i ∈ Di are i.i.d. samples conditioned on some unknown parameters
θ ∈ Θ. Let p(θ, D1, . . . , Dn) be the joint distribution of θ and n data providers’ datasets. We
consider two types of spaces for Θ in this paper: (1) θ has finite support, i.e., |Θ| = m is finite,
and (2) θ has continuous support, i.e. θ ∈ Rm and Θ ⊆ Rm. For the case of continuous support,
1This means that a data provider can report a different dataset without changing his reward as long as the
dataset leads to the same prediction for the underlying parameters as his true dataset.
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to alleviate computational issues, we consider a widely used class of distributions, the exponential
family.
The data analyst’s goal is to incentivize the data providers to give their true datasets with a budget
B. She needs to design a payment rule ri(D˜1, . . . , D˜n) for i ∈ [n] that decides how much to pay
data provider i according to all the reported datasets D˜1, . . . , D˜n. The payment rule should ideally
incentivize truthful reporting, that is, D˜i = Di for all i.
Before we formally define the desirable properties of a payment rule, we note that the analyst will
have to leverage the correlation between people’s data to distinguish a misreported dataset from a
true dataset because all she has access to is the reported datasets. To make the problem tractable, we
thus make the following assumption about the data correlation: parameters θ contains all the mutual
information between the datasets. More formally, the datasets are independent conditioned on θ.
Assumption 3.1. D1, . . . , Dn are independent conditioned on θ,
p(D1, . . . , Dn|θ) = p(D1|θ) · · · p(Dn|θ).
This is definitely not an assumption that would hold for arbitrarily picked parameters θ and any
datasets. One can easily find cases where the datasets are correlated to some parameters other than
θ. So the data analyst needs to carefully decides what to include in θ andDi, by either expanding θ
to include all relevant parameters or reducing the content ofDi to exclude all redundant data entries
that can cause extra correlations.
Example 3.1. Consider the linear regression model where provider i’s data points d
(j)
i =
(x
(j)
i , y
(j)
i ) consist of a feature vector x
(j)
i and a label y
(j)
i . We have a linear model
y
(j)
i = θ
Tx
(j)
i + ε
(j)
i .
Then datasets D1, . . . , Dn will be independent conditioning on θ as long as (1) different data
providers draw their feature vectors independently, i.e., x
(j1)
1 , . . . ,x
(jn)
n are independent for all
j1 ∈ [N1], . . . , jn ∈ [Nn], and (2) the noises are independent.
We further assume that the data analyst has some insight about the data generation process.
Assumption 3.2. The data analyst possesses a commonly accepted prior p(θ) and a commonly
accepted model for data generating process so that she can compute the posterior p(θ|Di), ∀i,Di.
When |Θ| is finite, p(θ|Di) can be computed as a function of p(θ|di) using the method in Ap-
pendix B. For a model in the exponential family, p(θ|Di) can be computed as in Definition 4.2.
Note that we do not always require the data analyst to know the whole distribution p(Di|θ), it
suffices for the data analyst to have the necessary information to compute p(θ|Di).
Example 3.2. Consider the linear regression model in Example 3.1. We use xi to represent all the
features in Di and use yi to represent all the labels in Di. If the features xi are independent from
θ, the data analyst does not need to know the distribution of xi. It suffices to know p(yi|xi, θ) to
compute p(θ|Di) because
p(θ|(xi,yi)) ∝ p((xi,yi)|θ)p(θ) = p(yi|xi, θ)p(xi|θ)p(θ) = p(yi|xi, θ)p(xi)p(θ)
∝ p(yi|xi, θ)p(θ).
Finally we assume that the identities of the providers can be verified.
Assumption 3.3. The data analyst can verify the data providers’ identities, so one data provider
can only submit one dataset and get one payment.
We now formally introduce some desirable properties of a payment rule. We say that a payment
rule is truthful if reporting true datasets is a weak equilibrium, that is, when the others report true
datasets, it is also (weakly) optimal for me to report the true dataset (based on my own belief).
Definition 3.1 (Truthfulness). Let D−i be the datasets of all providers except i. A payment
rule r(D1, . . . , Dn) is truthful if: for any (commonly accepted model of) underlying distribution
p(θ, D1, . . . , Dn), for every data provider i and any realization of his dataset Di, when all other
data providers truthfully report D−i, truthfully reportingDi leads to the highest expected payment,
where the expectation is taken over the distribution ofD−i conditioned onDi, i.e.,
ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(Di, D−i)] ≥ ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(D
′
i, D−i)], ∀i,Di, D
′
i.
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Note that this definition does not require the agents to actually know the conditional distribution and
to be able to evaluate the expectation themselves. It is a guarantee that no matter what the underlying
distribution is, truthfully reporting is an equilibrium.
Because truthfulness is defined as a weak equilibrium, it does not necessarily discourage misreport-
ing.2 What it ensures is that the mechanism does not encourage misreporting.3 So, we want a
stronger guarantee than truthfulness. We thus define sensitivity: the expected payment should be
strictly lower when the reported data does not give the accurate prediction of θ.
Definition 3.2 (Sensitivity). A payment rule r(D1, . . . , Dn) is sensitive if for any (commonly ac-
cepted model of) underlying distribution p(θ, D1, . . . , Dn), for any provider i and any realiza-
tion of his dataset Di, when all other providers j 6= i report D˜j(Dj) with accurate posterior
p(θ|D˜j(Dj)) = p(θ|Dj), we have (1) truthfully reportingDi leads to the highest expected payment
ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(Di, D˜−i(D−i))] ≥ ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(D
′
i, D˜−i(D−i))], ∀D
′
i
and (2) reporting a dataset D′i with inaccurate posterior p(θ|D
′
i) 6= p(θ|Di) is strictly worse than
reporting a dataset D˜i with accurate posterior p(θ|D˜i) = p(θ|Di),
ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(D˜i, D˜−i(D−i))] > ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(D
′
i, D˜−i(D−i))],
Furthermore, let ∆i = p(θ|D′i)− p(θ|Di), a payment rule is α-sensitive for agent i if
ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(Di, D˜−i(D−i))]− ED−i∼p(D−i|Di)[ri(D
′
i, D˜−i(D−i))] ≥ α‖∆i‖,
for allDi, D
′
i and reports D˜−i(D−i) that give the accurate posteriors.
Our definition of sensitivity guarantees that at an equilibrium, the reported datasets must give the
correct posteriors p(θ|D˜i) = p(θ|Di). We can further show that at an equilibrium, the analyst will
get the accurate posterior p(θ|D1, . . . , Dn).
Lemma 3.1. When D1, . . . , Dn are independent conditioned on θ, for any (D1, . . . , Dn) and
(D˜1, . . . , D˜n), if p(θ|Di) = p(θ|D˜i) ∀i, then p(θ|D1, . . . , Dn) = p(θ|D˜1, . . . , D˜n).
A more ideal property would be that the expected payment is strictly lower for any datasetD′i 6= Di.
Mechanisms that satisfy sensitivity can be viewed as an important step toward this ideal goal, as
the only possible payment-maximizing manipulations are to report a dataset D˜i that has the correct
posterior p(θ|D˜i) = p(θ|Di). Arguably, finding such a manipulation can be challenging. Sensitivity
guarantees the accurate prediction of θ at an equilibrium.
Second, we want a fair payment rule that is indifferent to data providers’ identities.
Definition 3.3 (Symmetry). A payment rule r is symmetric if for all permutation of n elements pi(·),
ri(D1, . . . , Dn) = rpi(i)(Dpi(1), . . . , Dpi(n)) for all i.
Third, we want non-negative payments and we want to use all the budget.
Definition 3.4 (IR and fixed budget). A payment rule r is individually rational if ri(D1, . . . , Dn) ≥
0, ∀i,D1, . . . , Dn. A payment rule r is budget-fixed if
∑n
i=1 ri(D1, . . . , Dn) = B, ∀D1, . . . , Dn.
We will consider two acquisition settings in this paper:
One-time data acquisition. The data analyst collects data in one batch. In this case, our problem
is very similar to the single-task forecast elicitation in [14]. But our model considers the budget
feasibility and the IR, whereas they only consider the truthfulness of the mechanism.
Multiple-time data acquisition. The data analyst repeatedly collects data for T ≥ 2 days. On
day t, (θ(t), D
(t)
1 , . . . , D
(t)
n ) is drawn independently from the same distribution p(θ, D1, . . . , Dn).
The analyst has a budget B(t) and wants to know the posterior of θ(t), p(θ(t)|D
(t)
1 , . . . , D
(t)
n ). In
this case, our setting differs from the multi-task forecast elicitation in [14] because providers can
2A constant payment rule is just a trivial truthful payment rule.
3Using a fixed test set may encourage misreporting.
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decide their strategies on a day based on all the observed historical data before that day.4 The multi-
task forecast elicitation in [14] asks the agents to submit forecasts of latent labels in multiple similar
independent tasks. It is assumed that the agent’s forecast strategy for one task only depends on his
information about that task but not the information about other tasks.
4 Preliminary
In this section, we introduce some necessary background for developing our mechanisms. We first
give the definitions of exponential family distributions. Our designed mechanism will leverage the
idea of mutual information between reported datasets to incentivize truthful reporting.
4.1 Exponential Family
Definition 4.1 (Exponential family [19]). A likehihood function p(x|θ), for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn
and θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rm is said to be in the exponential family in canonical form if it is of the form
p(x|θ) =
1
Z(θ)
h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x)
]
or p(x|θ) = h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x) −A(θ)
]
(1)
Hereφ(x) ∈ Rm is called a vector of sufficient statistics, Z(θ) =
∫
Xn h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x)
]
is called
the partition function, A(θ) = lnZ(θ) is called the log partition function.
In Bayesian probability theory, if the posterior distributions p(θ|x) are in the same probability dis-
tribution family as the prior probability distribution p(θ), the prior and posterior are then called
conjugate distributions, and the prior is called a conjugate prior for the likelihood function.
Definition 4.2 (Conjugate prior for the exponential family [19]). For a likelihood function in the ex-
ponential family p(x|θ) = h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x)−A(θ)
]
. The conjugate prior for θ with parameters
ν0, τ 0 is of the form
p(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0) = g(ν0, τ 0) exp
[
ν0θ
Tτ 0 − ν0A(θ)
]
. (2)
Let s = 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(xi). Then the posterior of θ can be represented in the same form as the prior
p(θ|x) ∝ exp
[
θT (ν0τ 0 + ns)− (ν0 + n)A(θ)
]
= P
(
θ|ν0 + n,
ν0τ 0 + ns
ν0 + n
)
,
where P
(
θ|ν0 + n,
ν0τ0+ns
ν0+n
)
is the conjugate prior with parameters ν0 + n and
ν0τ0+ns
ν0+n
.
A lot of commonly used distributions belong to the exponential family. Gaussian, Multinoulli, Multi-
nomial, Geometric, etc. Due to the space limit, we introduce only the definitions and refer the readers
who are not familiar with the exponential family to [19] for more details.
4.2 Mutual Information
We will use the point-wise mutual information defined in [14]. We introduce this notion of mutual
information in the context of our problem.
Definition 4.3 (Point-wise mutual information). We define the point-wise mutual information be-
tween two datasetsD1 andD2 to be
PMI(D1, D2) =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|D1)p(θ|D2)
p(θ)
dθ. (3)
For finite case, we define PMI(D1, D2) =
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|D1)p(θ|D2)
p(θ) dθ.
When |Θ| is finite or a model in the exponential family is used, the PMI will be computable.
4This is not to say that the providers will update their prior for θ(t) using the data on first t − 1 days.
Because we assume that θ(t) is independent from θ(t−1), . . . ,θ(t−1), so the data on first t − 1 days contains
no information about θ(t). We use the same prior p(θ) throughout all T days. What it means is that when the
analyst decides the payment for day t not only based on the report on day t but also the historical reports, the
providers may also use different strategies for different historical reports.
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Lemma 4.1. When |Θ| is finite, PMI(·) can be computed inO(|Θ|) time. If a model in exponential
family is used, so that the prior and all the posterior of θ can be written in the form
p(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0) = g(ν0, τ 0) exp
[
ν0θ
Tτ 0 − ν0A(θ)
]
,
p(θ|Di) = P(θ|νi, τ i) and p(θ|D−i) = P(θ|ν−i, τ−i), then the point-wise mutual information
can be computed as
PMI(Di, D−i) =
g(νi, τ i)g(ν−i, τ−i)
g(ν0, τ 0)g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
.
For single-task forecast elicitation, [14] proposes a truthful payment rule.
Definition 4.4 (log-PMI payment [14]). Suppose there are two data providers reporting D˜A and
D˜B respectively. Then the log-PMI rule pays them rA = rB = log(PMI(D˜A, D˜B)).
Proposition 4.1. When the log-PMI rule is used, the expected payment equals the mutual informa-
tion between D˜A and D˜B, where the expectation is taken over the distribution of D˜A and D˜B .
5 One-time Data Acquisition
In this section we apply [14]’s log-PMI payment rule to our one-time data acquisition problem. The
log-PMI payment rule ensures truthfulness, but its payment can be negative or unbounded or even ill-
defined. So we mainly focus on the mechanism’s sensitivity, budget-feasibility and IR. To guarantee
budget feasibility and IR, our mechanism requires a lower bound and an upper bound of PMI, which
may be difficult to find for some models in the exponential family.
If the analyst knows the distribution p(Di|θ), then she will be able to compute p(D−i|Di) =∑
θ
p(D−i|θ)p(θ|Di). In this case, we can employ peer prediction mechanisms [17] to design
payments and guarantee truthfulness. In Appendix C.1, we give an example of such mechanisms.
In this work we do not assume that p(Di|θ) is known (see Example 3.2). When p(Di|θ) is
unknown but the analyst can compute p(θ|Di), our idea is to use the log-PMI payment rule
in [14] and then add a normalization step to ensure budget-fixability and IR. However the log-
PMI will be ill-defined if PMI = 0. To avoid this, for each possible D−i, we define set
Di(D−i) = {Di|PMI(Di, D−i) > 0} and the log-PMI will only be computed for D˜i ∈ Di(D˜−i).
The normalization step will require an upper boundR and lower bound L of the log-PMI payment.5
If |Θ| is finite, we can find a lower bound and an upper bound in polynomial time, which we prove in
Appendix C.2. When a model in the exponential family is used, it is more difficult to find L and R.
By Lemma 4.1, if the g function is bounded, we will be able to bound the payment. For example, if
we are estimating the mean of a univariate Gaussian with known variance, L and R will be bounded
if the number of data points is bounded. Details can be found in Appendix C.3. Our mechanism
works as follows.
Mechanism 1: One-time data collecting mechanism.
(1) Ask all data providers to report their datasets D˜1, . . . , D˜n.
(2) If D˜i ∈ Di(D˜−i), we compute a score for his dataset si = logPMI(D˜i, D˜−i).
(3) The final payment for agent i is:
If D˜i ∈ Di(D˜−i), ri(D˜1, . . . , D˜n) = Bn (1 +
si− 1n−1
∑
j 6=i sj
R−L ); otherwise ri(D˜1, . . . , D˜n) = 0.
Theorem 5.1. Mechanism 1 is IR, truthful, budget-fixed, symmetric.
Note that by Proposition 4.1, the expected payment for a data provider is decided by the mutual
information between his data and other people’s data. The payments are efficiently computable for
finite-size Θ and for models in exponential family (Lemma 4.1).
Next, we discuss the sensitivity. We first define some notations. When |Θ| is finite, let Q
−i be
a (Πj∈[n],j 6=i|Dj |Nj) × |Θ| matrix that represents the conditional distribution of θ conditioning on
5WLOG, we can assume that L < R here. Because L = R implies that all agents’ datasets are independent.
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every realization of D−i. So the element in row D−i and column θ is equal to p(θ|D−i).We also
define the data generating matrix Gi with |Di| rows and |Θ| columns. Each row corresponds to a
possible data point di ∈ Di in the dataset and each column corresponds to a θ ∈ Θ. The element in
the row corresponding to data point di and the column θ is p(θ|di).
We give the sufficient condition for the mechanism to be sensitive.
Theorem 5.2. When |Θ| is finite, Mechanism 1 is sensitive if for all i, Q−i has rank |Θ|.
Since the size of Q−i can be exponentially large, it may be computationally infeasible to check the
rank ofQ−i. We thus give a simpler condition that only uses Gi, which has a polynomial size. This
simpler condition also shows that it is easy for Mechanism 1 to be sensitive.
Definition 5.1. The Kruskal rank (or k-rank) of a matrixM , denoted by rankk(M), is the maximal
number r such that any set of r columns ofM is linearly independent.
Corollary 5.1. When |Θ| is finite, Mechanism 1 is sensitive if for all i,
∑
j 6=i rankk(Gj) (Nj−1)+
1 ≥ |Θ|, where Nj is the number of data points in Dj .
In Appendix C.5.1, we also give a lower bound for α so that Mechanism 1 is α-sensitive.
When Θ ⊆ Rm, it becomes more difficult to guarantee sensitivity. Suppose the data analyst uses a
model from the exponential family so that the prior and all the posterior of θ can be written in the
form in Lemma 4.1. The sensitivity of the mechanism will depend on the normalization term g(ν, τ )
(or equivalently, the partition function) of the pdf. More specifically, define
hD−i(νi, τ i) =
g(νi, τ i)
g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ 0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
, (4)
then we have the following sufficient and necessary conditions for the sensitivity of the mechanism.
Theorem 5.3. When Θ ⊆ Rm, if the data analyst uses a model in the exponential family, then
Mechanism 1 is sensitive if and only if for any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i), we have PrD−i [hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6=
hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0.
The theorem basically means that the mechanism will be sensitive if any pairs of different reports
that will lead to different posteriors of θ can be distinguished by hD−i(·) with non-zero probability.
However, for different models in the exponential family, this is not always true. For example, if we
estimate the mean µ of a univariate Gaussian with a known variance and the Gaussian conjugate
prior is used, then the normalization term only depends on the variance but not the mean, so in this
case h(·) can only detect the change in variance, which means that the mechanism will be sensitive
to replication and withholding, but not necessarily other types of manipulations. But if we estimate
the mean of a Bernoulli distribution whose conjugate prior is the Beta distribution, then the partition
function will be the Beta function, which can detect different posteriors and thus the mechanism will
be sensitive. See Appendix C.4 for more details. The missing proofs can be found in Appendix C.5.
6 Multiple-time Data Acquisition
Now we consider the case when the data analyst needs to repeatedly collect data for the same task.
At day t, the analyst has a budget B(t) and a new ensemble (θ(t), D
(t)
1 , . . . , D
(t)
n ) is drawn from the
same distribution p(θ, D1, . . . , Dn), independent of the previous data. Again we assume that the
data generating distribution p(Di|θ) can be unknown, but the analyst is able to compute p(θ|Di))
after seeing the data(See Example 3.2). The data analyst can use the one-time purchasingmechanism
(Section 5) at each round. But we show that if the data analyst can give the payment one day after
the data is reported, a broader class of mechanisms can be used to guarantee the desirable properties,
which guarantees bounded payments without any assumptions on the underlying distribution.
Our method uses the f -mutual information gain in [14] for multi-task forecast elicitation. The
payment is specified by a differentiable convex function f : R→ R and its convex conjugate f∗.
Definition 6.1 (Convex conjugate). For any function f : R → R, define the convex conjugate
function of f as
f∗(y) = sup
x
xy − f(x).
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On day t, the data providers are first asked to report their data for day t. Then for each provider i,
we use the other providers’ reported data on day t − 1 and day t to evaluate provider i’s reported
data on day t− 1, that is, use D˜
(t−1)
−i and D˜
(t)
−i to evaluate D˜
(t−1)
i . A score si will be computed for
each provider’s reported dataset D˜
(t−1)
i on day t− 1.
The score si for dataset D˜
(t−1)
i is defined as the difference between its point-wise mutual informa-
tion (defined in Definition 4.3) with D˜
(t−1)
−i and its point-wise mutual information with D˜
(t)
−i , where
the difference is specified by a pair of functions (f ′(·), f∗(f ′(·))),
si = f
′(PMI(D˜(t−1)i , D˜(t−1)−i ))− f∗(f ′(PMI(D˜(t−1)i , D˜(t)−i))). (5)
The pair (f ′(·), f∗(f ′(·))) serves as a pair of distinguishers for the two distributions p(D−i|Di) and
p(D−i). The score si basically represents the difference (between p(D−i|Di) and p(D−i)) that is
identified by this pair of distinguishers based on the reported data.
According to the definition (5), if we carefully choose the convex function f to be a differentiable
convex function with a bounded derivative f ′ ∈ [0, U ] and with the convex conjugate f∗ bounded
on [0, U ], then the scores s1, . . . , sn will always be bounded. We can then normalize s1, . . . , sn so
that the payments are non-negative and sum up to B(t−1). Here we give one possible choice of f ′
that can guarantee bounded scores: the Logistic function 11+e−x .
f(x) f ′(x) range of f ′(x) f∗(x) range of f∗(x)
ln(1 + ex) 11+e−x [
1
2 , 1) on R
≥0 x ln x+ (1− x) ln(1− x) [− ln 2, 0] on [ 12 , 1)
Finally, if day t is the last day, we adopt the one-time mechanism to pay for day t’s data as well.
Mechanism 2:Multi-time data collecting mechanism.
Given a differentiable convex function f with f ′ ∈ [0, U ] and f∗ bounded on [0, U ]
for t = 1, . . . , T do
(1) On day t, ask all data providers to report their datasets D˜
(t)
1 , . . . , D˜
(t)
n .
(2) If t is the last day t = T , use the payment rule of Mechanism 1 to pay for day T ’s data or
just give each data providerB(T )/n.
(3) If t > 1, give the payments for day t− 1 as follows. First compute all the scores si as
in (5). Then normalize the scores so that the total payment is equal to the budget B(t−1). Let
the range of the scores be [L,R]. Assign payments
ri(D˜
(t−1)
1 , . . . , D˜
(t−1)
n ) =
B(t−1)
n
(
1 +
si− 1n−1
∑
j 6=i sj
R−L
)
.
end for
Our first result is that Mechanism 2 guarantees all the basic properties of a desirable mechanism.
Theorem 6.1. Given any differentiable convex function f that has (1) a bounded derivative f ′ ∈
[0, U ] and (2) the convex conjugate f∗ bounded on [0, U ], Mechanism 2 is IR, budget-fixed, truthful
and symmetric in all T rounds.
If we choose computable f ′ and f∗ (e.g. f ′ equal to the Logistic function), the payments will also be
computable for finite-size Θ and for models in exponential family (Lemma 4.1). Mechanism 2 has
basically the same sensitivity guarantee as Mechanism 1 in the first T − 1 rounds. We defer the sen-
sitivity analysis to Appendix D.1. The missing proofs in this section can be found in Appendix D.2.
7 Discussion
The limitations of our method point towards future directions. First, our one-time data acquisition
mechanism requires a lower bound and an upper bound of PMI, which may be difficult to find
for some models in the exponential family. A natural question is: can we find a mechanism that
would work for any data distribution, just as our multi-time data acquisition mechanism? Another
interesting direction is to design stronger mechanisms to strengthen the sensitivity guarantees in this
8
work. Finally, our method incentivizes truthful reporting, but it is not guaranteed that datasets that
give more accurate posteriors will receive higher payments (in expectation). It would be fairer if the
mechanism could have this property as well.
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A Mathematical Background
Our mechanisms are built with some important mathematical tools. First, in probability theory, an
f -divergence is a function that measures the difference between two probability distributions.
Definition A.1 (f -divergence). Given a convex function f with f(1) = 0, for two distributions over
Ω, p, q ∈ ∆Ω, define the f -divergence of p and q to be
Df (p, q) =
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)f
(
q(ω)
p(ω)
)
.
In duality theory, the convex conjugate of a function is defined as follows.
Definition A.2 (Convex conjugate). For any function f : R → R, define the convex conjugate
function of f as
f∗(y) = sup
x
xy − f(x).
Then the following inequality ([20, 14]) holds.
Lemma A.1 (Lemma 1 in [20]). For any convex function f with f(1) = 0, any two distributions
over Ω, p, q ∈ ∆Ω, let G be the set of all functions from Ω to R, then we have
Df (p, q) ≥ sup
g∈G
∫
ω∈Ω
g(ω)p(ω)− f∗(g(ω))q(ω) = sup
g∈G
Epg − Eqf
∗(g).
A function g achieves equality if and only if
g(ω) ∈ ∂f
(
p(ω)
q(ω)
)
, ∀ω
where ∂f
(p(ω)
q(ω)
)
represents the subdifferential of f at point p(ω)/q(ω).
The f -mutual information of two random variables is a measure of the mutual dependence of two
random variables, which is defined as the f -divergence between their joint distribution and the
product of their marginal distributions.
Definition A.3 (Kronecker product). Consider two matrices A ∈ Rm×n and B ∈ Rp×q . The
Kronecker product ofA and b, denoted asA⊗B, is defined as the following pm× qn matrix:
A⊗B =
a11B · · · a1nB... . . . ...
am1B · · · amnB
 .
Definition A.4 (f -mutual information and pointwise MI). Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables
with values over the space X × Y . If their joint distribution is pX,Y and marginal distributions are
pX and pY , then given a convex function f with f(1) = 0, the f -mutual information between X
and Y is
If (X ;Y ) = Df (pX,Y , pX ⊗ pY ) =
∫
x∈X ,y∈Y
pX,Y (x, y)f
(
pX(x) · pY (y)
pX,Y (x, y)
)
.
We define pointwise mutual informationK(x, y) as the reciprocal of the ratio inside f ,
K(x, y) =
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x) · pY (y)
.
If two random variables are independent conditioning on another random variable, we have the
following formula for the pointwise mutual information.
Lemma A.2. When random variables X,Y are independent conditioning on θ, for any pair of
(x, y) ∈ X × Y , we have pointwise mutual information
K(x, y) =
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|x)p(θ|y)
p(θ)
if |Θ| is finite, and
K(x, y) =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|x)p(θ|y)
p(θ)
dθ
if Θ ⊆ Rm.
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Proof. We only prove the second equation forΘ ⊆ Rm as the proof for finite Θ is totally similar.
K(x, y) =
p(x, y)
p(x) · p(y)
=
∫
θ∈Θ p(x|θ)p(y|θ)p(θ) dθ
p(x) · p(y)
=
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|x)p(θ|y)
p(θ)
dθ,
where the last equation uses Bayes’ Law.
Definition A.5 (Exponential family [19]). A probability density function or probability mass func-
tion p(x|θ), for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n and θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rm is said to be in the exponential family in
canonical form if it is of the form
p(x|θ) = h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x) −A(θ)
]
(6)
where A(θ) = log
∫
Xm h(x) exp
[
θTφ(x)
]
. The conjugate prior with parameters ν0, τ 0 for θ has
the form
p(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0) = g(ν0, τ 0) exp
[
ν0θ
Tτ 0 − ν0A(θ)
]
. (7)
Let s = 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(xi). Then the posterior of θ is of the form
p(θ|x) ∝ exp
[
θT (ν0τ 0 + ns)− (ν0 + n)A(θ)
]
= P
(
θ|ν0 + n,
ν0τ 0 + ns
ν0 + n
)
,
where P
(
θ|ν0 + n,
ν0τ0+ns
ν0+n
)
is the conjugate prior with parameters ν0 + n and
ν0τ0+ns
ν0+n
.
Lemma A.3. Let θ be the parameters of a pdf in the exponential family. Let P(θ|ν, τ ) =
g(ν, τ ) exp
[
νθTτ − νA(θ)
]
denote the conjugate prior for θ with parameters ν, τ . For any three
distributions of θ,
p1(θ) = P(θ|ν1, τ 1),
p2(θ) = P(θ|ν2, τ 2),
p0(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0),
we have ∫
θ∈Θ
p1(θ)p2(θ)
p0(θ)
dθ =
g(ν1, τ 1)g(ν2, τ 2)
g(ν0, τ 0)g(ν1 + ν2 − ν0,
ν1τ1+ν2τ2−ν0τ 0
ν1+ν2−ν0 )
.
Proof. To compute the integral, we first write p1(θ), p2(θ) and p3(θ) in full,
p1(θ) = P(θ|ν1, τ 1) = g(ν1, τ 1) exp
[
ν1θ
Tτ 1 − ν1A(θ)
]
,
p2(θ) = P(θ|ν2, τ 2) = g(ν2, τ 2) exp
[
ν2θ
Tτ 2 − ν2A(θ)
]
,
p0(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0) = g(ν0, τ 0) exp
[
ν0θ
Tτ 0 − ν0A(θ)
]
.
Then we have the integral equal to∫
θ∈Θ
p1(θ)p2(θ)
p0(θ)
dθ
=
∫
θ∈Θ
g(ν1, τ 1) exp
[
ν1θ
Tτ 1 − ν1A(θ)
]
g(ν2, τ 2) exp
[
ν2θ
Tτ 2 − ν2A(θ)
]
g(ν0, τ 0) exp [ν0θTτ 0 − ν0A(θ)]
dθ
=
g(ν1, τ 1)g(ν2, τ 2)
g(ν0, τ 0)
∫
θ∈Θ
exp
[
θT (ν1τ 1 + ν2τ 2 − ν0τ 0)−A(θ)(ν1 + ν2 − ν0)
]
dθ
=
g(ν1, τ 1)g(ν2, τ 2)
g(ν0, τ 0)
·
1
g(ν1 + ν2 − ν0,
ν1τ1+ν2τ2−ν0τ 0
ν1+ν2−ν0 )
.
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The last equality is because
g
(
ν1 + ν2 − ν0,
ν1τ 1 + ν2τ 2 − ν0τ 0
ν1 + ν2 − ν0
)
exp
[
θT (ν1τ 1 + ν2τ 2 − ν0τ 0)−A(θ)(ν1 + ν2 − ν0)
]
is the pdf
p
(
θ|ν1 + ν2 − ν0,
ν1τ 1 + ν2τ 2 − ν0τ 0
ν1 + ν2 − ν0
)
and thus has the integral over θ equal to 1.
B Missing proof for Lemma 3.1
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 3.1). When D1, . . . , Dn are independent conditioned on θ, for any
(D1, . . . , Dn) and (D˜1, . . . , D˜n), if p(θ|Di) = p(θ|D˜i) ∀i, then p(θ|D1, . . . , Dn) =
p(θ|D˜1, . . . , D˜n).
Proof. Suppose ∀i, p(θ|Di) = p(θ|D′i), then we have
p(θ|D1, D2, · · · , Dn) =
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn, θ)
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn)
=
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn|θ) · p(θ)
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn)
=
p(D1|θ) · p(D2|θ) · · · p(Dn|θ) · p(θ)
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn)
=
p(D1, θ) · p(D2, θ) · · · p(Dn, θ) · p(θ)
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn) · pn(θ)
=
p(θ|D1) · p(θ|D2) · · · p(θ|Dn) · p(D1) · p(D2) · · · · p(Dn)
p(D1, D2, · · · , Dn) · pn−1(θ)
∝
p(θ|D1) · p(θ|D2) · · · p(θ|Dn)
pn−1(θ)
.
Similarly, we have
p(θ|D′1, D
′
2, · · · , D
′
n) ∝
p(θ|D′1) · p(θ|D
′
2) · · · p(θ|D
′
n)
pn−1(θ)
,
since the analyst calculate the posterior by normalize the terms, we have
p(θ|D1, D2, · · · , Dn) = p(θ|D
′
1, D
′
2, · · · , D
′
n).
C One-time data acquisition
C.1 An example of applying peer prediction
The mechanism is as follows.
Mechanism 3: One-time data collecting mechanism by using Brier Score.
(1) Ask all data providers to report their datasets D˜1, . . . , D˜n.
(2) For all D−i, calculate probability p(D−i|Di) by the reportedDi and p(Di|θ).
(3) The Brier score for agent i is si = 1−
1
|D−i|
∑
D−i
(p(D−i|D˜i)− I[D−i = D˜−i])2,
where I[D−i = D˜−i] = 1 if D−i is the same as the reported D˜−i and 0 otherwise.
(4) The final payment for agent i is ri =
B
n ·
(
1 + si −
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i si
)
.
This payment function is actually the mean square error of the reported distribution on D−i. It is
based on the Brier score which is first proposed in [3] and is a well-known bounded proper scoring
rule. The payments of the mechanism are always bounded between 0 and 1.
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Theorem C.1. Mechanism 3 is IR, truthful, budget-bounded, symmetric.
Proof. The symmetric property is easy to verify. Moreover, since the payment for each agent is
in the interval [0, 1], the mechanism is then budget-bounded and IR. We only need to prove the
truthfulness. Suppose that all the other agents except i reports truthfully. Agent i has true dataset
Di and reports D˜i. Since in the setting, the analyst is able to calculate p(D−i|Di), then if the agent
receives si as their payment, from agent i’s perspective, his expected revenue is then:
Rev′i =
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) ·
1−∑
D′−i
(p(D′−i|D˜i)− I[D
′
−i = D−i])
2

= −
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di)
∑
D′−i
(
p(D′−i|D˜i)
2
)
− 2p(D−i|D˜i)

=
∑
D−i
(
−p(D−i|D˜i)
2
+ 2p(D−i|D˜i)p(D−i|Di)
)
Since the function −x2 + 2ax is maximized when x = a, the revenue Rev′i is maximized when
∀D−i, p(D−i|D−i) = p(D−i|Di). Since the real payment ri is a linear transformation of si and
the coefficients are independent of the reported datasets, reporting the dataset with the true posterior
will still maximize the agent’s revenue and the mechanism is truthful.
C.2 Bounding log-PMI: discrete case
In this section, we give a method to compute the bounds of the log-PMI score when |Θ| is finite.
First we give the upper bound of the PMI. We have for any i,Di ∈ Di(D−i)
PMI(Di, D−i) ≤ max
i,D′−i,D
′
i
∈Di(D′−i)
{PMI(D′i, D
′
−i)}
= max
i,D′−i,D
′
i
∈Di(D′−i)
{∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|D′i)p(θ|D
′
−i)
p(θ)
}
≤ max
i,D′
i
{∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|D′i)
minθ{p(θ)}
}
≤
1
minθ{p(θ)}
.
The last inequality is because we have
∑
θ
p(θ|D′i) = 1.
Since we have assumed that p(θ) is positive, the term 1minθ{p(θ)} could then be computed and is
finite. Thus we just let R be log
(
1
minθ{p(θ)}
)
. Then we need to calculate a lower bound of the
score. We have for any i,D−i andDi ∈ Di(D−i)
PMI(Di, D−i) =
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
≥
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di)p(θ|D−i). (8)
Claim C.1. Let D = {d(1), . . . , d(N)} be a dataset with N data points that are i.i.d. conditioning
on θ. Let D be the support of the data points d. Define
T =
maxθ∈Θ p(θ)
minθ∈Θ p(θ)
, U(D) = max
θ∈Θ,d∈D
p(θ|d)
/
min
θ∈Θ,d∈D:p(θ|d)>0
p(θ|d) ,
Then we have
maxθ∈Θ p(θ|D)
minθ:p(θ|D)>0 p(θ|D)
≤ U(D)N · TN−1.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.1, we have
p(θ|D) ∝
∏
j p(θ|d
(j))
p(θ)N−1
,
for a fixedD, it must hold that
maxθ∈Θ p(θ|D)
minθ:p(θ|D)>0 p(θ|D)
≤ U(D)N · TN−1.
Claim C.2. For any two datasetsDi andDj with Ni andNj data points respectively, let Di be the
support of the data points inDi and let Dj be the support of the data points inDj . Then
maxθ∈Θ p(θ|Di, Dj)
minθ:p(θ|Di,Dj)>0 p(θ|Di, Dj)
≤ U(Di)
Ni · U(Dj)
Nj · TNi+Nj−1.
Proof. Again by Lemma 3.1, we have
p(θ|Di, Dj) ∝
p(θ|Di)p(θ|Dj)
p(θ)
.
Combine it with Claim C.1, we prove the statement.
Then for anyDi, since
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ|Di) = 1, by Claim C.1,
min
θ:p(θ|Di)>0
p(θ|Di) ≥
1
1 + |Θ| · U(Di)Ni · TNi−1
, η(Di, Ni).
And for anyD−i, since
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ|D−i) = 1, by Claim C.2,
min
θ:p(θ|D−i)>0
p(θ|D−i) ≥
1
1 + |Θ| · Πj 6=iU(Dj)Nj · T
∑
j 6=i Nj−1
, η(D−i, N−i).
Finally, for any i,D−i,andDi ∈ Di(D−i), according to (8),
PMI(Di, D−i) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di)p(θ|D−i) ≥ η(Di, Ni) · η(D−i, N−i).
The last inequality is because Di ∈ Di(D−i) and there must exists θ ∈ Θ so that both p(θ|Di)
and p(θ|D−i) are non-zero. Both η(Di, Ni) and η(D−i, N−i) can be computed in polynomial time.
Take minimum over i, we find the lower bound for PMI.
C.3 Bounding log-PMI: continuous case
Consider estimating the mean µ of a univariate Gaussian N (x|µ, σ2) with known variance σ2. Let
D = {x1, . . . , xN} be the dataset and denote the mean by x =
1
N
∑
j xj . We use the Gaussian
conjugate prior,
µ ∼ N (µ|µ0, σ
2
0).
Then according to [18], the posterior of µ is equal to
p(µ|D) = N (µ|µN , σ
2
N ),
where
1
σ2N
=
1
σ20
+
N
σ2
only depends on the number of data points.
By Lemma 4.1, we know that the payment function for exponential family is in the form of
PMI(Di, D−i) =
g(νi, τ i)g(ν−i, τ−i)
g(ν0, τ 0)g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
.
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The normalization term for Gaussian is 1√
2piσ2
, so we have
PMI(Di, D−i) =
√
1
σ20
+ Niσ2
√
1
σ20
+ N−iσ2√
1
σ20
√
1
σ20
+ Ni+N−iσ2
.
When the total number of data points has an upper boundNmax, each of the square root term should
be bounded in the interval [
1
σ0
,
√
1
σ20
+
Nmax
σ2
]
Therefore PMI(Di, D−i) is bounded in the interval[(
1 +Nmaxσ
2
0/σ
2
)−1/2
, 1 +Nmaxσ
2
0/σ
2
]
.
C.4 Sensitivity analysis for the exponential family
If we are estimating the mean µ of a univariate Gaussian N (x|µ, σ2) with known variance σ2. Let
D = {x1, . . . , xN} be the dataset and denote the mean by x =
1
N
∑
j xj . We use the Gaussian
conjugate prior,
µ ∼ N (µ|µ0, σ
2
0).
Then according to [18], the posterior of µ is equal to
p(µ|D) = N (µ|µN , σ
2
N ),
where
1
σ2N
=
1
σ20
+
N
σ2
only depends on the number of data points. Since the normalization term 1√
2piσ2
of Gaussian distri-
butions only depends on the variance, function h(·) defined in (12)
hD−i(Ni, xi) =
g(νi, τ i)
g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
=
√
1
σ20
+
Ni
σ2
/√
1
σ20
+
Ni +N−i
σ2
will only be changed if the number of data pointsNi changes, which means that the mechanism will
be sensitive to replication and withholding, but not necessarily other types of manipulations.
If we are estimating the mean µ of a Bernoulli distribution Ber(x|µ). Let D = {x1, . . . , xN} be
the data points. Denote by α =
∑
i xi the number of ones and denote by β =
∑
i 1−xi the number
of zeros. The conjugate prior is the Beta distribution,
p(µ) = Beta(µ|α0, β0) =
1
B(α0, β0)
µα0−1(1− µ)β0−1.
where B(α0, β0) is the Beta function
B(α0, β0) =
(α0 + β0 − 1)!
(α0 − 1)!(β0 − 1)!
.
The posterior of µ is equal to
p(µ|D) = Beta(µ|α0 + α, β0 + β).
Then we have
hD−i(α, β) =
B(α0 + αi + α−i, β0 + βi + β−i)
B(α0 + αi, β0 + βi)
=
(α0 + β0 +Ni +N−i − 1)!(α0 + αi − 1)!(β0 + βi − 1)!
(α0 + αi + α−i − 1)!(β0 + βi + β−i − 1)!(α0 + β0 +Ni − 1)!
.
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Define Ai = α0 + αi − 1 and Bi = β0 + βi − 1, since Ni = αi + βi and N−i = α−i + β−i, we
have
hD−i(α, β) = hα−i,β−i(Ai, Bi) =
Ai!Bi!(Ai +Bi + α−i + β−i + 1)!
(Ai + α−i)!(Bi + β−i)!(Ai +Bi + 1)!
Now we are going to prove that for any two different pairs (Ai, Bi) and (A
′
i, B
′
i), there should
always exists a pair (α′−i, β
′
−i) selected from the four pairs: (α−i, βi), (α−i + 1, βi), (α−i, βi +
1), (α−i + 1, βi + 1), such that hα′−i,β′−i(Ai, Bi) 6= hα′−i,β′−i(A
′
i, B
′
i).
Suppose that this does not hold, then there should exist two pairs (Ai, Bi) and (A
′
i, B
′
i) such that for
each (α′−i, β
′
−i) in the four pairs, hα′−i,β′−i(Ai, Bi) = hα′−i,β′−i(A
′
i, B
′
i).
Then by the two cases when (α′−i, β
′
−i) = (α−i, β−i) and (α−i + 1, β−i) we can derive that
hα−i+1,β−i(Ai, Bi)
hα−i,β−i(Ai, Bi)
=
hα−i+1,β−i(A
′
i, B
′
i)
hα−i,β−i(A
′
i, B
′
i)
Ai +Bi + α−i + 1 + β−i + 1
Ai + α−i + 1
=
A′i +B
′
i + α−i + 1 + β−i + 1
A′i + α−i + 1
(Ai +Bi −A
′
i −B
′
i)(α−i + 1) + (A
′
i −Ai)(α−i + β−i + 2) +A
′
iBi −AiB
′
i = 0
Replacing β−i with β−i + 1, we could get
(Ai +Bi −A
′
i −B
′
i)(α−i + 1) + (A
′
i −Ai)(α−i + β−i + 3) +A
′
iBi −AiB
′
i = 0
Subtracting the last equation from this, we get A′i − Ai = 0. Symmetrically, when (α
′
−i, β
′
−i) =
(α−i, β−i) and (α−i, β−i + 1) and replacing α−i with α−i + 1, we have B′i − Bi = 0 and thus
(Ai, Bi) = (A
′
i, B
′
i). This contradicts to the assumption that (Ai, Bi) 6= (A
′
i, B
′
i). Therefore for any
two different pairs of reported data in the Bernoulli setting, at least one in the four others’ reported
data (α−i, βi), (α−i+1, βi), (α−i, βi+1), (α−i+1, βi+1)would make the agent strictly truthfully
report his posterior.
C.5 Missing proofs
C.5.1 Proof for Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2
Theorem C.2 (Theorem 5.1). Mechanism 1 is IR, truthful, budget-bounded, symmetric.
We suppose that the dataset space of agent i is Di. We first give the definitions of several matrices.
These matrices are essential for our proofs, but they are unknown to the data analyst. Since the
dataset Di consists of Ni i.i.d data points drawn from the data generating matrix Gi, we define
prediction matrix Pi of agent i to be a matrix with |Di| = |D|Ni rows and |Θ| columns. Each
column corresponds to a θ ∈ Θ and each row corresponds to a possible dataset Di ∈ Di. The
matrix element on the column corresponding to θ and the row corresponding to Di is p(Di|θ).
Intuitively, this matrix is the posterior of agent i’s dataset conditioned on the parameter θ.
Similarly, we define the out-prediction matrix P−i of agent i to be a matrix with
∏
j 6=i |Dj | rows
and |Y | columns. Each column corresponds to a θ ∈ Θ and each row corresponds to a possible
dataset D−i ∈ D−i. The element corresponding to D−i and θ is p(D−i|θ). In the proof, we also
give a lower bound on the sensitiveness coefficient α related to these out-prediction matrices.
Theorem C.3 (Theorem 5.2). Mechanism 1 is sensitive if either condition holds:
1. ∀i, Q−i has rank |Θ|.
2. ∀i,
∑
i′ 6=i rankk(Gi′ ) · (Ni′ − 1) + 1 ≥ |Θ|.
Moreover, it is ei ·
B
n·(R−L) - sensitive for agent i, where ei is the smallest singular value of matrix
P−i.
Proof. We first prove that the payment ri should be bounded. By definition, we have for all j ∈ [n]
R ≥ sj ≥ L. We denote the term
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i sj as s−i. Then
si−s−i
R−L should be bounded in [−1, 1]
and the final payment for each agent should be bounded in the interval [0, 2Bn ].
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We suppose that agent i’s expected revenue of Mechanism 1 is Revi. Then we have
Revi =
B
n
·
(
1 +
∑
D−i∈Di(D−i) p(D−i|Di) · logPMI(D˜i, D−i)− s−i
R− L
)
.
We consider another revenueRev′i ,
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i)·p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
)
assuming that
0 · log 0 = 0. Then we have
Rev′i =
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
)
=
∑
D−i,Di∈Di(D−i)
p(D−i|Di) · logPMI(D˜i, D−i)
+
∑
D−i,Di /∈Di(D−i)
p(D−i|Di) · logPMI(D˜i, D−i)
=
∑
D−i,Di∈Di(D−i)
p(D−i|Di) · logPMI(D˜i, D−i) +
∑
D−i,Di /∈Di(D−i)
0 · log 0
=
∑
D−i,Di∈Di(D−i)
p(D−i|Di) · logPMI(D˜i, D−i)
= Revi ·
n
B
· (R − L)−R+ L+ s−i.
Rev′i is a linear transformation of Revi. The coefficients L, R,
n
B and s−i do not depend on D˜i.
The ratio nB · (R − L) is larger than 0. Therefore, the optimal reported D˜i for Revi should be the
same as that for Rev′i. If the a payment rule with revenueRev
′
i is ei - sensitive for agent i, then the
Mechanism 1 would then be ei ·
B
n·(R−L) - sensitive. In the following part, we prove that real dataset
Di would maximize the revenueRev
′
i and theRev
′
i is ei ·
B
n·(R−L) - sensitive for all the agents. Thus
in the following parts we prove the revenue Rev′i is ei - sensitive for agent i.
Rev′i =
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
)
=
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ, D−i)
p(θ)
)
−
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log (p(D−i))
=
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ, D−i)
p(θ)
)
− C.
Since the term
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log (p(D−i)) does not depend on D˜i, agent i could only manipu-
late to modify the term
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) · log
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i)·p(θ,D−i)
p(θ)
)
. Since we have
∑
D−i,θ
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ, D−i)
p(θ)
=
∑
θ
1
p(θ)
∑
D−i
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ, D−i)

=
∑
θ
1
p(θ)
(
p(θ|D˜i) · p(θ)
)
=
∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i)
= 1,
Since we have
∑
D−i
(∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i)·p(θ,D−i)
p(θ)
)
= 1, we could view the term
∑
θ
p(θ|D˜i)·p(θ,D−i)
p(θ) as
a probability distribution on the variable D−i. Since it depends on D˜i, we denote it as p˜(D−i|D˜i).
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Since if we fix a distributions p(σ), then the distribution q(σ) that maximizes
∑
σ p(σ) log q(σ)
should be the same as p. (If we assume that 0 · log 0 = 0, this still holds.) When agent i report
truthfully, ∑
θ
p(θ|Di) · p(θ, D−i)
p(θ)
=
∑
θ
p(Di, θ) · p(D−i, θ)
p(Di) · p(θ)
=
∑
θ
p(Di|θ) · p(D−i, θ)
p(Di)
=
∑
θ
p(Di|θ) · p(D−i|θ) · p(θ)
p(Di)
=
∑
θ
p(Di, D−i, θ)
p(Di)
= p(D−i|Di).
The data provider can always maximize Rev′i by truthfully reporting Di. And we have proven the
truthfulness of the mechanism.
Then we need to prove the relation between the sensitiveness of the mechanism and the out-
prediction matrices. When Alice reports D˜i the revenue difference from truthfully report is then
∆Rev′
i
=
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) log p(D−i|Di)−
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) log p˜(D−i|Di)
=
∑
D−i
p(D−i|Di) log
p(D−i|Di)
p˜(D−i|Di)
= DKL(p‖p˜)
≥
∑
D−i
‖p(D−i|Di)− p˜(D−i|Di)‖2.
We let the distribution difference vector be ∆i (Note that here ∆i is a |Θ|-dimension vector), then
we have
∆Rev′
i
≥
∑
D−i
|p(D−i|Di)− p˜(D−i|Di)|2 ≥
∑
D−i
∥∥∥∥∥∑
θ
(p(θ|Di)− p˜(θ|Di)) · p(D−i|θ)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖P−i∆i‖2.
Since ei is the minimum singular value of P−i and thus PT−iP−i − eiI is semi-positive, we have
‖P−i∆i‖2 = ∆Ti P
T
−iP−i∆i
= ∆Ti (P
T
−iP−i − eiI)∆i +∆
T
i eiI∆i
≥ ∆Ti eiI∆i
≥ ei∆
T
i ∆i
= ‖∆i‖ · ei.
Finally get the payment rule with revenue Rev′i is ei-sensitive for agent i. If all P−i has rank |Θ|,
then all the singular values of the matrix P−i should have positive singular values and for all i,
ei > 0. By now we have proven that if all the P−i has rank |Θ|, then the mechanism is sensitive.
Since p(θ|Di) = p(Di|θ) ·
p(θ)
p(Di)
, we have the matrix equation:
Q−i = ΛD
−1
i · P−i · Λθ,
where ΛD
−1
i =

1
p(D1
i
)
1
p(D2
i
)
. . .
1
p(D
|Di|
i
)
 and Λθ =

p(θ1)
p(θ2)
. . .
p(θ|Θ|)
 .
p(Dji ) is the probability that agent i gets the dataset D
j
i . p(θk) is the probability of the prior of
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the parameter θ with index k. Both are all diagnal matrices. Both of the diagnal matrices well-
defined and full-rank. Thus the rank of P−i should be the same as Q−i and we have proved the first
condition.
The proof for the second sufficient condition is directly derived from the paper [25] and the condition
1. We first define a matrix G′i with the same size as Gi while its elements are p(di|θ) rather than
p(θ|di). Since for all i′ ∈ [n] the prediction matrix Pi′ is the columnwise Kronecker product
(defined in Lemma 1 in [25] which is shown below) of Ni′ data generating matrices. By using
the following Lemma in [25], if the k-rank of G′i′ is r, then each time we multiply(columnwise
Kronecker product) a matrix by G′i′ , the k-rank would increase by at least rankk(G
′
i′ ), or reach the
cap of |Θ|.
Lemma C.1. Consider two matrices A = [a1,a2, · · · ,aF ] ∈ R
I×F ,B = [b1, b2, · · · , bF ] ∈
R
J×F andA⊙c B is the columnwise Krocnecker product ofA andB defined as:
A⊙c B , [a1 ⊗ b1,a2 ⊗ b2, · · · ,aF ⊗ bF ] ,
where ⊗ stands for the Kronecker product. It holds that
rankk(A⊙c B) ≥ min{rankk(A) + rankk(B)− 1, F}.
Therefore the final k-rank of the Ni′ would be no less than min{Ni · (r − 1) + 1, |Θ|}. We then
need to calculate the k-rank of the out-prediction matrix of each agent i and verify whether it is
|Θ|. Similarly, the out-prediction matrix of agent i is the columnwise Kronecker product of all the
other agent’s prediction matrices. By the same lower bound tool in [25], the k-rank of P−i should
be at least min{
∑
i′ 6=i rankk(G
′
i′ ) · (Ni′ − 1) + 1, |Θ|} and by Theorem 5.2, if the k-rank of all
prediction matrices are all |Θ|, Mechanism 1 should be sensitive.
C.5.2 Missing Proof for Theorem 5.3
When Θ ⊆ Rm and a model in the exponential family is used, we prove that the mechanism will be
sensitive if and only if for any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i),
Pr
D−i
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0. (9)
We first show that the above condition is equivalent to that for any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i),
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0, (10)
whereD−i is drawn from p(D−i|Di) but not p(D−i). This is because, by conditional independence
of the datasets, for any event E , we have
Pr
D−i|Di
[E ] =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di) Pr
D−i|θ
[E ] dθ
and
Pr
D−i
[E ] =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ) Pr
D−i|θ
[E ] dθ.
Since both p(θ) and p(θ|Di) are always positive because they are in exponential family, it should
hold that
Pr
D−i|Di
[E ] > 0 ⇐⇒ Pr
D−i
[E ] > 0.
Therefore (9) is equivalent to (10), and we only need to show that the mechanism is sensitive if and
only if (10) holds.
When we’re using a (canonical) model in exponential family, the prior p(θ) and the posteriors
p(θ|Di), p(θ|D−i) can be represented in the standard form (7),
p(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0),
p(θ|Di) = P
(
θ|νi, τ i
)
,
p(θ|D−i) = P
(
θ|ν−i, τ−i
)
,
p(θ|D˜i) = P
(
θ|ν′i, τ
′
i
)
,
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where ν0, τ 0 are the parameters for the prior p(θ), νi, τ i are the parameters for the posterior p(θ|Di),
ν−i, τ−i are the parameters for the posterior p(θ|D−i), and ν′i, τ
′
i are the parameters for p(θ|D˜i).
From the proof for Theorem 5.1, we know that the difference between the expected score of reporting
Di and the expected score of reporting D˜i 6= Di is equal to
∆Rev = DKL(p(D−i|Di)‖p(D−i|D˜i)).
Therefore if p(D−i|D˜i) differs from p(D−i|Di) with non-zero probability, that is,
Pr
D−i|Di
[p(D−i|Di) 6= p(D−i|D˜i)] > 0, (11)
then∆Rev > 0. By Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3,
p(D−i|Di) =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
dθ =
g(νi, τ i)g(ν−i, τ−i)
g(ν0, τ 0)g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
.
p(D−i|D˜i) =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|D˜i)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
dθ =
g(ν′i, τ
′
i)g(ν−i, τ−i)
g(ν0, τ 0)g(ν′i + ν−i − ν0,
ν′
i
τ ′
i
+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
ν′
i
+ν−i−ν0 )
.
Therefore (11) is equivalent to
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(νi, τ i) 6= hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i)] > 0.
Therefore if for all (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i), we have
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(νi, τ i) 6= hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i)] > 0,
then reporting any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) will lead to a strictly lower expected score, which means the
mechanism is sensitive. To prove the other direction, if the above condition does not hold, i.e., there
exists (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) with
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] = 0,
then reporting (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) will give the same expected score as truthfully reporting (νi, τ i),
which means that the mechanism is not sensitive.
D Multiple-time data acquisition
D.1 Sensitivity analysis
We first give the sensitivity analysis for finite-size |Θ|. The results are basically the same as the ones
for the one-time data acquisition mechanism except that we do not give a lower bound for α.
Theorem D.1. When |Θ| is finite, if f is strictly convex, then Mechanism 2 is sensitive in the first
T − 1 rounds if either of the following two conditions holds,
(1) ∀i, Q−i has rank |Θ|.
(2) ∀i,
∑
i′ 6=i rankk(Gi′ ) · (Ni′ − 1) + 1 ≥ |Θ|.
When Θ ⊆ Rm is a continuous space, the results are entirely similar to the ones for Mechanism 1
but with slightly different proofs.
Suppose the data analyst uses a model from the exponential family so that the prior and all the
posterior of θ can be written in the form in Lemma 4.1. The sensitivity of the mechanism will
depend on the normalization term g(ν, τ ) (or equivalently, the partition function) of the pdf. Define
hD−i(νi, τ i) =
g(νi, τ i)
g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ 0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
, (12)
then we have the following sufficient and necessary conditions for the sensitivity of the mechanism.
Theorem D.2. When Θ ⊆ Rm, if the data analyst uses a model in the exponential family and a
strictly convex f , then Mechanism 2 is sensitive in the first T − 1 rounds if and only if for any
(ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i), we have PrD−i [hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0.
See Section 5 for interpretations of this theorem.
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D.2 Missing proofs
The following part are the proofs for our results.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. It is easy to verify that the mechanism is IR, budget-fixed and symmetric.
We prove the truthfulness as follows.
Let’s look at the payment for day t. At day t, data provider i reports a dataset D˜
(t)
i . Assuming that
all other data providers truthfully reportD
(t)
−i , data provider i’s expected payment is decided by his
expected score
E
D
(t)
−i ,D
(t+1)
−i |D(t)i
[si]
=E
D
(t)
−i |D(t)i
f ′
(
v(q˜i, p(θ|D
(t)
−i)
)
− E
D
(t+1)
−i
f∗
(
f ′(v(q˜i, p(θ|D
(t+1)
−i ))
)
. (13)
The second expectation is taken over the marginal distribution p(D
(t+1)
−i ) without conditioning on
D
(t)
i becauseD
(t+1) is independent fromD(t), so we have p(D
(t+1)
−i |D
(t)
i ) = p(D
(t+1)
−i ).
We then use Lemma A.1 to get an upper bound of the expected score (13) and show that truthfully
reporting Di achieves the upper bound. We apply Lemma A.1 on two distributions of D−i, the
distribution ofD−i conditioning onDi, p(D−i|Di), and the marginal distribution p(D−i). Then we
have
Df (p(D−i|Di), p(D−i)) ≥ sup
g∈G
ED−i|Di [g(D−i)]− ED−i [f
∗(g(D−i))], (14)
where f is the given convex function, G is the set of all real-valued functions ofD−i. The supremum
is achieved and only achieved at function g with
g(D−i) = f ′
(
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
)
for all D−i. (15)
Consider function gq˜i(D−i) = f
′(v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i))). Then (14) gives an upper bound of the ex-
pected score (13) as
Df (p(D−i|Di), p(D−i)) ≥ ED−i|Di [gq˜i(D−i)]− ED−if
∗(gq˜i(D−i))
= ED−i|Di [f
′(v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i)))]− ED−i [f
∗(f ′(v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i))))].
By (15), the upper bound is achieved only when
gq˜i(D−i) = f
′
(
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
)
for allD−i,
that is
f ′(v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i))) = f ′
(
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
)
for all D−i. (16)
Then it is easy to prove the truthfulness. Truthfully reporting Di achieves (16) because by
Lemma A.2, for allDi andD−i,
v(p(θ|Di), p(θ|D−i)) =
p(Di, D−i)
p(Di)p(D−i)
=
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
.
Again, letQ
−i be a (Πj∈[n],j 6=i|Dj |Nj )×|Θ|matrix with elements equal to p(θ|D−i) and letGi be
the |Di| × |Θ| data generating matrix with elements equal to p(θ|di). Then we have the following
sufficient conditions for the mechanism’s sensitivity.
Proof of Theorem D.1. We then prove the sensitivity. For discrete and finite-size Θ, we prove
that when f is strictly convex andQ−i has rank |Θ|, the mechanism is sensitive. When f is strictly
convex, f ′ is a strictly increasing function. Then condition (16) is equivalent to
v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i)) =
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
for all D−i. (17)
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We show that when matrix Q−i has rank |Θ|, q˜i = p(θ|Di) is the only solution of (17), which
means that the payment rule is sensitive. By definition of v(·),
v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i)) =
∑
θ∈Θ
q˜i(θ)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
= (Q−iΛq˜i)D−i
where Λ is the |Θ| × |Θ| diagonal matrix with 1/p(θ) on the diagonal. Then if q˜i = p(θ|Di) and
q˜i = q are both solutions of (17), we must have
Q−iΛp(θ|Di) = Q−iΛq =⇒ Q−iΛ(p(θ|Di)− q) = 0.
SinceQ−iΛ must have rank |Θ|, which means that the columns ofQ−iΛ are linearly independent,
we must have
p(θ|Di)− q = 0,
which completes our proof of sensitivity for finite-size Θ.
Proof of Theorem D.2. When Θ ⊆ Rm and a model in the exponential family is used, we prove
that when f is strictly convex, the mechanism will be sensitive if and only if for any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6=
(νi, τ i),
Pr
D−i
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0. (18)
We first show that the above condition is equivalent to that for any (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i),
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0, (19)
whereD−i is drawn from p(D−i|Di) but not p(D−i). This is because, by conditional independence
of the datasets, for any event E , we have
Pr
D−i|Di
[E ] =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di) Pr
D−i|θ
[E ] dθ
and
Pr
D−i
[E ] =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ) Pr
D−i|θ
[E ] dθ.
Since both p(θ) and p(θ|Di) are always positive because they are in exponential family, it should
hold that
Pr
D−i|Di
[E ] > 0 ⇐⇒ Pr
D−i
[E ] > 0.
Therefore (18) is equivalent to (19), and we only need to show that the mechanism is sensitive if and
only if (19) holds.
We then again apply Lemma A.1. By Lemma A.1 and the strict convexity of f , q˜i achieves the
supremum if and only if
v(q˜i, p(θ|D−i)) =
p(D−i|Di)
p(D−i)
for all D−i.
By the definition of v and Lemma A.2, the above condition is equivalent to∫
θ∈Θ
q˜i(θ)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
dθ =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|Di)p(θ|D−i)
p(θ)
dθ for allD−i. (20)
When we’re using a (canonical) model in exponential family, the prior p(θ) and the posteriors
p(θ|Di), p(θ|D−i) can be represented in the standard form (7),
p(θ) = P(θ|ν0, τ 0),
p(θ|Di) = P
(
θ|νi, τ i
)
,
p(θ|D−i) = P
(
θ|ν−i, τ−i
)
,
q˜i = P
(
θ|ν′i, τ
′
i
)
,
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where ν0, τ 0 are the parameters for the prior p(θ), νi, τ i are the parameters for the posterior p(θ|Di),
ν−i, τ−i are the parameters for the posterior p(θ|D−i), and ν′i, τ
′
i are the parameters for q˜i. Then
by Lemma A.3, the condition that q˜i achieves the supremum (20) is equivalent to
g(ν′i, τ
′
i)
g(ν′i + ν−i − ν0,
ν′
i
τ ′
i
+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ0
ν′
i
+ν−i−ν0 )
=
g(νi, τ i)
g(νi + ν−i − ν0,
νiτ i+ν−iτ−i−ν0τ 0
νi+ν−i−ν0 )
, for all D−i. (21)
which, by our definition of h(·), is just
hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) = hD−i(νi, τ i), for all D−i.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem D.2. Since (18) is equivalent to (19), we only need to show
that the mechanism is sensitive if and only if for all (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i),
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] > 0.
If the above condition holds, then q˜i with parameters (ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) should have a non-zero
loss in the expected score (13) compared to the optimal solution p(θ|Di) with parameters (νi, τ i),
which means that the mechanism is sensitive. For the other direction, if the condition does not hold,
i.e., there exists (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) with
Pr
D−i|Di
[hD−i(ν
′
i, τ
′
i) 6= hD−i(νi, τ i)] = 0,
then reporting (ν′i, τ
′
i) 6= (νi, τ i) will give the same expected score as truthfully reporting (νi, τ i),
which means that the mechanism is not sensitive.
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